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Abstract 
The models decomposing the redistributive effect of fiscal systems into vertical and horizontal effects are 
extensively used by practitioners. The Duclos, Jalbert and Araar’s (2003) model, despite its advantages, 
has not yet been extensively employed in empirical research, possibly due to certain difficulties emerging 
in its implementation. This paper addresses some of these problems and offers advice on how to solve 
them. Unfolding the estimation and calculation procedures it helps practitioners to properly apply the 
model. The procedures are first illustrated on small hypothetical population and then employed on the real 
data scenario for Croatian fiscal system. Connections with Kakwani’s (1984) decomposition and the issue 
of vertical effect as a measure of potential redistributive effect are also thoroughly discussed. 
Keywords: redistributive effect, vertical equity, horizontal inequity, pre-fiscal equals 
JEL: D63, H22, H23 
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1. Introduction 
Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003) (DJA) have designed a comprehensive model for measurement 
of vertical, classical horizontal inequity (CHI) and reranking effects of fiscal system. It is built 
into the framework of the Atkinson-Gini social welfare function (AGF), which first converts 
incomes into utilities employing Atkinson (1970) utility function, and then aggregates them 
using rank-dependent weights, which underlie the S-Gini coefficients proposed by Donaldson 
and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983).1 
The AGF framework gives the DJA model certain advantages over its competitors, the 
widely acknowledged Kakwani’s (1984) (K84) and Aronson, Johnson and Lambert’s (1994) 
(AJL) decompositions of RE, which are set up in the Gini environment. Namely, by 
incorporating the utility function, the DJA model enables a natural appraisal of CHI effect. On 
the other hand, to measure CHI effect the AJL model relies on somewhat arbitrary procedure of 
“groups of close equals” formation, while K84 does not even contain the separate CHI term. 
Despite its great measurement potential, the DJA model has not yet become more widely 
employed by practitioners.2 The model requires the estimation of expected post-fiscal incomes 
(EPI) and expected post-fiscal utilities (EPU) at different points of the pre-fiscal income 
distribution (PRFID), which calls for certain statistical expertise related to data smoothing and 
curve fitting methods. Inaccurate estimates of EPI and EPU result in unreliable values of 
indicators in the DJA model. 
This paper carefully explains the procedures of data manipulations, calculations, and 
estimations needed to obtain the indices of the DJA model. Several hints are suggested that make 
the work of practitioners easier and their results more confident. The relationship between the 
DJA and other models is described. Two important issues emerged during the empirical research: 
the presence of large number of exact pre-fiscal equals and the non-increasing EPI are observed 
for the data employed. In that respect certain adjustments are made concerning calculation 
procedures and interpretation of results. 
                                                   
1
 Araar and Duclos (2003, 2006) describe the properties of AGF based inequality indices: “Income inequality 
aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is captured by rank-dependent 
ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the assessment of inequality and equity.” 
Furthermore, it is shown that AGF is the only family of social evaluation functions “to obey a set of popular axioms 
in the income distribution literature” (the principle of transfers, the principle of population, scale invariance, etc.).  
2
 One application can be found in Bilger (2008), who uses the DJA model to analyse redistributive features of the 
health system financing in Switzerland. 
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As a result, the paper can serve as a manual for practitioners applying the DJA 
methodology, accompanying the original Duclos, Jalbert and Araar’s (2003) work. Furthermore, 
because of the relations of the DJA model with other models, such as K84, it can be useful to all 
practitioners employing standard methodologies in the field of income redistribution.  
Section 2 briefly exposes the elements of the DJA model and its connections with the 
K84 decomposition. Section 3 extensively describes the procedures of data preparation, 
estimation and calculation of various elements of the DJA model. The methodology is first 
applied to small hypothetical population, and then, in section 4, to Croatian system of personal 
taxes and social benefits in 2008 and the results are thoroughly discussed. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The DJA model 
The change of income inequality induced by fiscal system is called the redistributive effect (RE). 
In measurement terms, we have that ( ) ( )I X I N∆ = − , where ∆  represents RE, while ( )I X  and 
( )I N  are indices of pre- and post-fiscal income inequality.3  
In the DJA model, inequality indices ( )I ⋅  are derived using Atkinson-Gini social welfare 
function, proposed by Araar and Duclos (2003, 2006): 
 
1
0
( , , ) ( ( ), ) ( , )W X U X p p dpε ν ε ω ν= ∫  (1) 
where ε  is ethical parameter configuring the Atkinson’s (1970) utility function, 
1( ( ), ) ( ( )) / (1 )U X p X p εε ε−= −  for 1ε ≠ , with p  denoting the quantiles of pre-fiscal income 
distribution, and ( )X p  the income at p .4 The term ν  is another ethical parameter, 
characterizing the Donaldson and Weymark’s (1980) and Yitzhaki’s (1983) S-Gini rank-
dependent weighting scheme, 1( , ) (1 )p p νω ν ν −= − . The equally distributed equivalent income 
(EDEI) is an inverse function of ( )W ⋅  and is obtained as 1/(1 )( , , ) ((1 ) ( , , ))X W X εξ ε ν ε ε ν −= −  for 
1ε ≠ . Finally, the Atkinson-Gini inequality index is calculated as follows: 
 ( ) 1 ( , , ) / XI X Xξ ε ν µ= −  (2) 
where Xµ  is the mean pre-fiscal income. ( )I N  is obtained analogously, using the quantiles of 
post-fiscal income distribution. 
                                                   
3
 Generally, pre-fiscal (post-fiscal) income is income before (after) taxes and benefits. 
4
 To simplify the presentation, the formulas referring to the case when 1ε =  are omitted. 
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The DJA model decomposes RE as follows: 
 [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]E P E PV C R I X I N I U I N I N I U∆ = − − = − − − − −  (3) 
The vertical effect, ( ) ( )EV I X I N= − , represents the potential RE or the reduction of 
inequality that would be achieved by the counterfactual, horizontally equitable system.5 The 
discrepancy between potential and actual RE is divided into CHI effect, ( ) ( )P EC I U I N= − , and 
reranking effect, ( ) ( )PR I N I U= − , which measure two different manifestations of horizontal 
inequity (HI). The former effect (C ) measures HI emerging from violation of the ‘classical 
horizontal equity principle’, which says that equals should be treated equally. The latter effect 
( R ) evaluates HI arising from the infringement of the ‘no-reranking principle’, requiring that 
fiscal process does not change ranks of income units in transition from pre- to post-fiscal 
income.6  
In equation (3), ( )EN p  represents expected post-fiscal incomes, obtained as 
1
0
( ) ( | )EN p N q p dq= ∫ , where ( | )N q p  denotes a post-fiscal income at the qth quantile among 
all those income units belonging to the pth quantile of pre-fiscal income distribution. ( , )PU p ε  is 
the expected post-fiscal utility at the pth quantile of PRFID, obtained as 
1
0
( , ) ( ( | ), )PU p U N q p dqε ε= ∫ . For ( )EN p  and ( , )PU p ε  we obtain respective social welfare 
functions 
1
0
( , , ) ( ( ), ) ( , )E EW N U N p p dpε ν ε ω ν= ∫  and 
1
0
( , , ) ( , ) ( , )P PW U U p p dpε ν ε ω ν= ∫ , 
while corresponding inequality indices are ( , , )EI N ε ν 1 ( , , ) /E NNξ ε ν µ= −  and ( , , )PI U ε ν =
 
1 ( , , ) /P NUξ ε ν µ= − , where Nµ  is the mean post-fiscal income. 
When 0ε = , utilities are identical to incomes: ( ,0)U y y= . Therefore, we have that 
)0),|(( pqNU )|( pqN=  across all p  and ( | )N q p , and it follows that 
( ,0, ) ( ,0, )E PW N W Uν ν=  and ( ,0, ) ( ,0, )E PI N I Uν ν= . The consequence for the DJA model is 
that CHI effect collapses to zero, and the decomposition (3) can be rewritten as: 
 (0, ) (0, ) (0, ) ( ( ,0, ) ( ,0, )) ( ( ,0, ) ( ,0, ))E EV R I X I N I N I Nν ν ν ν ν ν ν∆ = − = − − −  (4) 
                                                   
5
 For more detailed interpretation of different effects, see discussion in section 4.4 below. 
6
 For example, families A and B have pre-fiscal incomes of 10$, while C and D have 20$. Suppose that A, B, C and 
D end up with post-fiscal incomes of 8, 16, 12, 24, respectively. Among pre-fiscal equals (A and B; C and D) CHI 
has occurred, while between pre-fiscal unequals (B and C) reranking has taken place. 
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It can be shown that ( ,0, )I X ν , ( ,0, )I N ν  and ( ,0, )EI N ν  are the S-Gini coefficient of 
pre-fiscal income, ( , )G X ν , the S-Gini coefficient of post-fiscal income, ( , )G N ν , and the S-
Gini concentration coefficient of post-fiscal income, ( , )D N ν , respectively.7 
Consequently, (0, )V ν  is equal to the S-Gini Kakwani’s (1984) index of vertical effect, 
( ) ( , ) ( , )KV G X D Nν ν ν= − , and (0, )R ν  is the S-Gini Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) 
index of reranking, ( )APR ν = ( , ) ( , )G N D Nν ν− .8 The Kakwani’s (1984) decomposition of RE 
into vertical and horizontal components can be rewritten in the S-Gini terms as: 
 ( ) ( ) (0, ) ( ( , ) ( , )) ( ( , ) ( , ))K APV R G X D N G N D Nν ν ν ν ν ν ν∆ = − = − − −  (5) 
On the other hand, when 1ν = , the weights ( , )pω ν  are all equal and reranking 
disappears: ( ) ( ) 0PR I N I U= − = . For 0ε > , the vertical and CHI effect, ( ,1)V ε  and ( ,1)C ε , 
become the indices consistent with the Duclos and Lambert’s (2001) model of HI measurement.9 
3. Calculation of indices 
3.1. Basic data preparation 
A typical research uses the following data for a household or family k : (a) unequivalized pre- 
and post-fiscal incomes, kX&  and kN& , (b) survey frequency (or sampling) weights, kf , and (c) 
                                                   
7
 Independent proof of this relationship can be found in Yitzhaki and Olkin (1991) who derive the ‘relative 
concentration curve’ of post-fiscal income N  with respect to pre-fiscal income X  as 
1 ( )
, 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )XF pN x N XC p m t dF tµ
−
−
−∞
= ∫ , where { }xXNExm == |)(  corresponds to ( )EN p . Duclos and 
Araar (2006) present the same concentration curve as , 1
0
( ) ( ) ( )pN x N EC p N r drµ −= ∫ , from which the S-Gini 
concentration coefficient is obtained as 
1
,
0
( , ) ( ( )) ( , )N xD N p C p p dpν ϖ ν= −∫ , where 
2( , ) ( 1)(1 )p p νϖ ν ν ν −= − −  are rank-dependent weights. 
8
 Originally, all these indices are defined for 2ν = , where ( ,0,2)I X  is the standard Gini coefficient. 
9
 These authors have derived their indices using the „cost of inequality“ approach, compared to the “change of 
inequality” approach, used in this paper. Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003) employ both methods to derive the DJA 
model.  
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equivalence factor kβ .10 Equivalized pre- and post-fiscal incomes are kkk XX β/&=  and 
kkk NN β/&= . The frequency weights are defined as kkk f βφ = .11 
To obtain xiM , the matrix { }kkkk NXM φ,,0 =  is sorted lexicographically – first by 
increasing order of pre-fiscal income and then, within each group of pre-fiscal equals, in 
increasing order of post-fiscal income. Sorting 0kM  by increasing order of post-fiscal income, the 
matrix niM , is obtained. Now, from 
x
kM  and 
n
kM  we extract the relevant columns – income 
vectors xiX , 
x
iN , 
n
iN  and the frequency weights 
x
iφ  and niφ . 
3.2. The estimates of quantiles 
We turn to the estimation of the quantiles xipˆ  and the weights νϖ ,ˆ xi  needed for computation of 
social welfare in (1). For the sample with s  units, they can be obtained in the following way: 
 
1
11
ˆ (2 ) ( )ix x xi j jjp S φ φ− −== +∑  (6) 
 
, 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )x xi iS pν νω ν− −= −  (7) 
where ∑
=
=
s
j
x
jS 1φ  and 00 =xφ . Analogously, nkpˆ  and ,ˆ nk νω  are obtained. 
Assume a group of q  exact pre-fiscal equals, whose pre-fiscal incomes are 
1 , ,
x x
b b qX X+ += =K , where b  is a value between 0 and s q− . Since the weights ,ˆ xi νω  are strictly 
decreasing in xipˆ , we have that 
, ,
ˆ ˆ...
x x
b b q
ν νω ω +> > . However, this contradicts the notion of the 
indices based on rank-dependent weights: the units with same pre-fiscal income belong to the 
same quantile, and should have equal weights. Thus, we need the new set of weights, ,x
r
νω
)
. They 
are equal to ,ˆ x
r
νω  if the unit r  is not a member of exact-equals groups. On the other hand, if the 
unit r  does belong to the above mentioned group of exact pre-fiscal equals, they are calculated 
as: 
                                                   
10
 For an explanation of these items see the concrete example of Croatian data in section 3.2. 
11
 It is considered here that a household k  has kβ  ‘equivalent’ members instead of some number ku  of ‘real’ 
individuals; thus, each equivalized income pair ),( kk NX  will be counted kφ  and not kkuf  times. 
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, 1 ,
1 1
ˆ( )q b qx x x xr j c cj c b
ν νω φ φ ω+−
= = +
= ⋅∑ ∑
)
 (8) 
Typically, exact pre-fiscal equals are quite rare in real-world samples. However, in the 
research on Croatian individual taxes and cash social benefits, one of the scenarios treated public 
pensions as social benefits and hence they were not part of pre-fiscal income. Therefore, the 
sample contained a large number of zero pre-fiscal income equals. Below we will see how the 
results would be affected if the transformation of ,ˆ xi νω  into 
,x
i
νω
)
 was not made.  
3.3. Utilities, social welfare and indices of inequality 
The following equations show how to obtain utilities, Gini-Atkinson welfare index and the 
inequality index for pre-fiscal income xiX , when 1ε ≠ : 
 
1( , ) ( ) / (1 )x xi iU X X εε ε−= −  (9) 
 
, ,
1
( , , ; ) ( , )sx x x x xi i j j jjW X U X
ν νε ν ω ε φ ω
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑
) ) )
 (10) 
 
1
, , 1
ˆ( , , ; ) 1 [(1 ) ( , , ; )] / ( )x x x x xi i i i iI X W X Xν ν εε ν ω ε ε ν ω µ−= − −
) )) )
 (11) 
where 1ˆ ( ) ( ) sx x xi i iiX S Xµ ϕ
−
= ∑  is the mean pre-fiscal income. Analogously to (9), (10) and (11), 
other utilities, welfare and inequality indices are obtained, as shown in the Appendix.  
In section 3.1 the adapted set of weights is derived to account for the case of pre-fiscal 
equals. The inequality indices obtained for xiN , as shown by formulas (23) and (25) in the 
Appendix, will be different: ,ˆ ˆ( , , ; )x xi iI N νε ν ω > ,( , , ; )x xi iI N νε ν ω
) )
.
12
 
                                                   
12
 To see why, recall how the weights νϖ ,ˆ xi  and 
,x
i
νϖ)  are constructed; also, remember that incomes xiN  within 
each group of exact equals are sorted in ascending order. Simple example will demonstrate the algebraic effect. 
Three units all have the same pre-fiscal income of 20; their post-fiscal incomes are 10, 20 and 30. The respective 
weights under the scheme A are 3, 2 and 1, while the weights B are 2, 2, 2. The sum-product of post-fiscal incomes 
and weights A (weights B) is 100 (<120). Similarly, , ,ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )x x x xi i i iW N W Nν νε ν ω ε ν ω<
) )
. On the other hand, 
the sum-product of pre-fiscal incomes and weights A (weights B) is 120 (=120). Hence, 
, ,
ˆ
ˆ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )x x x xi i i iW X W Xν νε ν ω ε ν ω=
) )
. 
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3.3. Estimation of expected post-fiscal incomes and utilities 
,( , , ; )x xi iI X νε ν ω
) )
 and ,ˆ ˆ( , , ; )n ni iI N νε ν ω  are sample estimates of pre- and post-fiscal income 
inequality, ( )I X  and ( )I N . As we can see from (3), the full application of the DJA model 
requires the estimates of another two indices, ( )EI N  and ( )PI U , which are derived from the 
income and utility variables, ( )EN p  and ( , )PU p ε . ( )EN p  are expected post-fiscal incomes 
(EPI), and ( , )PU p ε  are expected post-fiscal utilities (EPU), at each quantile of PRFID, p . 
Their sample representatives will be denoted as EiN  and ,
P
iU ε , respectively. 
The counterfactual post-fiscal incomes EiN  are the estimates of EPI for each value of 
pre-fiscal income xiX . To obtain them, we must smooth a dataset ( xiX , xiN ), i.e. approximate the 
mean response curve Em  in the regression relationship ( )x E xi i iN m X δ= + . The basic form of the 
curve Em  is chosen by the analyst from the great variety of possible choices, such as OLS 
polynomial regressions, kernel regressions, local polynomial regressions, Gini regressions, 
Fourier transformations, etc. Let ( )E xim X%  be the approximation of Em ; then, ( )E E xi iN m X= % . 
Following the same approach as for EiN , for some chosen value of ε , we can estimate 
the regression relationship ,( , ) ( )x P xi i iU N m Xεε δ= +  to obtain the approximation , ( )P xim Xε%  and 
another vector of fitted values ,
,
( )P P xi iU m Xεε = % . It shows expected post-fiscal utilities at different 
points of the PRFID. 
Estimation of EiN  and ,
P
iU ε  is relatively difficult task as it involves the use of statistical 
techniques which are still regarded as non-standard. On the other hand, relatively small 
inaccuracies can result in large biases in the final indices. Here, we explain two useful hints for 
users who empirically apply the DJA model. 
The following identity says that the sample estimate of ( )PI U  can be obtained simply 
using post-fiscal incomes xiN , accompanied by proper weights, 
,x
i
νω
)
: 
 
, ,
,
( , , ; ) ( , , ; )x x P xi i i iI N I Uν νεε ν ω ε ν ω=
) )) )
 (12) 
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Note that each different value of ε  chosen by an analyst (for example, in sensitivity 
analysis) requires new estimation of 
,
P
iU ε . However, thanks to the property (12), ,PiU ε  does not 
need to be estimated at all, but instead we can simply use ,( , , ; )x xi iI N νε ν ω
) )
. 
When 0ε = , it follows that ( , 0)x xi iU N Nε = = , and , 0P Ei iU Nε = = . From (12) we derive 
the following equality: 
 
, ,( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )E x x xi i i iI N I Nν νν ω ν ω=
) )) )
 (13) 
Thus we arrive to the second hint: if the elements of EiN  are appropriately estimated, the 
inequality indices ,( ,0, ; )E xi iI N νν ω
) )
 for different values of parameter ν  should be equal to the 
inequality indices obtained for ,( ,0, ; )x xi iI N νν ω
) )
. If there are significant differences in these 
indices, based on EiN  and 
x
iN , we should suspect that the present approximation ( )E xim X%  is 
poor, and try some different configuration of the function. 
3.4. The DJA and K84 decompositions – implementation formulas 
Having defined all the needed indices, we can present RE and its decompositions in terms of 
sample estimates formulas. RE is obtained as ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )x ni iI X I Nε ν∆ = −
) )
. According to the DJA 
model from (3), RE is decomposed as follows: 
 
, ,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
=[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
x E P E n P
i i i i i i
x E x E n x
i i i i i i
V C R
I X I N I U I N I N I U
I X I N I N I N I N I N
ε ε
ε ν ε ν ε ν ε ν∆ = − − =
− − − − − =
= − − − − −
) )) )
) ) ) ) ) )
) ) ) ) ) )
 (14) 
where the last row manifests the property (12), by which 
,
( ) ( )P xi iI U I Nε =
) )
. The differences in the 
brackets – ( , ) ( ) ( )x Ei iV I X I Nε ν = −
) ) )
, 
,
( , ) ( ) ( )P Ei iC I U I Nεε ν = −
) ) ) ( ) ( )x Ei iI N I N= −
) )
 and 
,
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )n P n xi i i iR I N I U I N I Nεε ν = − = −
) ) ) ) )
 – are the vertical, CHI and reranking effects of the 
DJA model. 
For analytical reasons, we can divide both ( , )R ε ν)  and ( , )C ε ν)  into two parts: 
 
ˆ ˆ( , ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
ˆ ˆ( , ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
n x x x
i i i i
x E x x
i i i i
R I N I N I N I N
C I N I N I N I N
ε ν
ε ν
= − + −
= − − −
) ) )
) ) )  (15) 
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The difference ˆˆ ( , ) ( ) ( )x xi iI N I Nψ ε ν = −
)
 in (15) is positive and shows by how much the 
true value of reranking effect (CHI effect) is underestimated (overestimated), if )(ˆ xiNI  is used 
instead of )( xiNI
)
. The terms ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )n xi iR I N I Nψ ε ν = −
)
 and ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )x Ei iC I N I Nψ ε ν = −
) )
 will be 
referred to as the ‘underestimated reranking term’ and ‘overestimated CHI term’. 
Setting 0ε =  and following (5), we can calculate the S-Gini K84 decomposition: 
 
, , , ,
( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ[ ( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )] [ ( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )]
K AP
x x x x n n x x
i i i i i i i i
V R
I X I N I N I Nν ν ν ν
ν ν ν
ν ω ν ω ν ω ν ω
∆ = − =
= − − −
) ) )
) ) )) ) )
 (16) 
Analogously to the above procedure for the DJA model, we can decompose ( )KV ν)  and 
( )APR ν)  to show how the unadjusted weights ,ˆ xi νω  can produce the wrong estimates of these 
indices: 
 
, , , ,
, , , ,
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )] [ ( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )]
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )] [ ( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )]
K x x x x x x x x
i i i i i i i i
AP n n x x x x x x
i i i i i i i i
V I X I N I N I N
R I N I N I N I N
ν ν ν ν
ν ν ν ν
ν ν ω ν ω ν ω ν ω
ν ν ω ν ω ν ω ν ω
= − + −
= − + −
) ) )) )
) ) )
 (17) 
Equation (17) shows that the use of unadjusted weights will underestimate both the 
Kakwani vertical and Atkinson-Plotnick reranking effect by the amount of ˆ (0, )ψ ν =  
, ,
ˆ
ˆ( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )x x x xi i i iI N I Nν νν ω ν ω−
) )
.
13
 
3.5. Hypothetical data example 
The first example employs a hypothetical population of twelve income units. Table 1 presents 
most of the vectors needed for computation of different indices. The bottom six units are pre-
fiscal exact equals with zero pre-fiscal incomes xiX , while the remaining units have different 
pre-fiscal incomes. The two sets of weights are presented: the original ones, ,ˆ xi
νω , obtained by 
(7), which assume that all units have different pre-fiscal incomes, and the weights ,xi νω
)
, which 
are same as the original ones for the units #7 to #12, while for the units #1 to #6, they are equal 
to 6/ˆ6
1
,, ∑
=
=
c
x
c
x
i
νν ϖϖ) , as the rule (8) requires. 
                                                   
13
 The K84 model and the relevant indices are usually calculated using formulas different from the present ones. 
Note that these other calculation procedures should also be adjusted to account for presence of exact equals. 
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TABLE 1 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE (UTILITIES FOR 5.0=ε ; WEIGHTS FOR 2=ν ) 
# νϖ ,ˆ xi  
νϖ ,xi
)
 
x
iX  
x
iN  
n
iN  
E
iN  ),( εxiXU
 
),( εxiNU
 
),( εniNU
 
),( εEiNU
 
P
iU ε,  
1 0.160 0.125 0 10 10 52 0.00 6.32 6.32 14.43 13.70 
2 0.146 0.125 0 20 20 52 0.00 8.94 8.94 14.43 13.70 
3 0.132 0.125 0 30 30 52 0.00 10.95 10.95 14.43 13.70 
4 0.118 0.125 0 50 50 52 0.00 14.14 14.14 14.43 13.70 
5 0.104 0.125 0 80 75 52 0.00 17.89 17.32 14.43 13.70 
6 0.090 0.125 0 110 80 52 0.00 20.98 17.89 14.43 13.70 
7 0.076 0.076 50 100 100 76 14.14 20.00 20.00 17.44 16.15 
8 0.063 0.063 100 75 110 100 20.00 17.32 20.98 20.00 18.61 
9 0.049 0.049 150 150 125 124 24.49 24.49 22.36 22.27 21.06 
10 0.035 0.035 200 125 150 148 28.28 22.36 24.49 24.32 23.52 
11 0.021 0.021 300 250 200 196 34.64 31.62 28.28 27.99 28.43 
12 0.007 0.007 400 200 250 244 40.00 28.28 31.62 31.22 33.34 
 1 1 1200 1200 1200 1200 161.56 223.31 223.31 229.85 223.31 
Post-fiscal incomes xiN  of the first six units are sorted in ascending order, following the 
procedure from section 2.1. There is a large variation among incomes within this group of exact 
pre-fiscal equals. Furthermore, the unit #6 has larger post-fiscal income than the units #7 and #8, 
which is the evidence of reranking; other instances of reranking are between the units #5 and #8, 
#7 and #8, #9 and #10, #11 and #12. 
Table 1 presents different utility vectors obtained for 5.0=ε . Two specific vectors, EiN  
and PiU ε, , are estimated in the following way. They are calculated as 
E E E x
i iN a b X= + %%  and 
,
P P P x
i iU a b Xε = + %% , where Ea% , 
Eb% , Pa%  and Pb%  are coefficients obtained by Gini regressions in 
which xiX  was an independent variable, while 
x
iN  and ( , )xiU N ε  were respective dependent 
variables.14 
                                                   
14
 See Schechtman, Yitzhaki and Artsev (2008) for details about Gini regressions. The beta coefficient for the first 
regression is , ,( , ) / ( , )E x x x xi i i ib COV N COV Xν ντ τ= ) )% , where , , /x xi isν ντ ϖ ν=) ) . The alpha coefficient is 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )E x E xi ia N b Xµ µ= −
)
% . 
12 
 
FIGURE 1 
EXPECTED POST-FISCAL INCOMES AND UTILITIES (UTILITIES FOR 5.0=ε ;GINI REGRESSIONS FOR 2=ν ) 
(a)      (b) 
0
100
200
300
0 100 200 300 400
Po
st
-
fis
ca
l i
nc
o
m
e
Pre-fiscal income
Series1 Series2
0
10
20
30
40
0 100 200 300 400
Po
st
-
fis
ca
l u
til
ity
Pre-fiscal income
Series1 Series2
 
Figure 1a shows actual post-fiscal incomes xiN  and expected post-fiscal incomes 
E
iN , 
plotted against pre-fiscal incomes xiX . Figure 1b presents utilities of actual post-fiscal incomes 
)5.0,( =εxiNU  and their expected values PiU ε, . 
The inequality indices are calculated for four combinations of parameters ε  and ν , and 
presented in Table 2. The use of two sets of weights, νϖ ,ˆ xi  and ,xi
νϖ) , enables us to make 
distinction between )(ˆ xiNI  and )( xiNI
)
, and to properly capture the reranking and CHI effects.  
As the discussion concerning (15) reveals, in presence of pre-fiscal equals the measure 
( , )Rψ ε ν)  would underestimate the true amount of reranking by ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν , which is quite high in 
our hypothetical case for 2=ν  and 3=ν . At the same time, CHI effect is overestimated if 
ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )x Ei iC I N I Nψ ε ν = −
) )
 is used as a measure.  
On the other hand, these problems do not occur in the last scenario, because when 1=ν  
the weights νϖ ,ˆ xi  for all units are identical, reranking collapses to zero. 
TABLE 2 
INDICES OBTAINED FOR HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION 
0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
3=ν  
5.0=ε  
1=ν  
( )xiI X
)
 0.666667 0.924304 0.984997 0.546834 
)(ˆ niNI  0.388889 0.479165 0.619086 0.134222 
)(ˆ xiNI  0.368056 0.465696 0.607441 0.134222 
13 
 
)( xiNI
)
 0.319444 0.411984 0.500583 0.134222 
,
( )PiI U ε
)
 0.319444 0.411984 0.500583 0.134222 
( )EiI N
)
 0.319444 0.349193 0.437733 0.072948 
 
( , )ε ν∆)  0.277778 0.445139 0.365911 0.412612 
( , )V ε ν)  0.347222 0.575111 0.547264 0.473886 
( , )C ε ν)  0.000000 0.062791 0.062850 0.061274 
( , )R ε ν)  0.069444 0.067181 0.118503 0.000000 
 
 
ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν  0.048611 0.053711 0.106858 0.000000 
( , )Rψ ε ν)
 
0.020833 0.013469 0.011645 0.000000 
( , )Cψ ε ν)
 
0.048611 0.116503 0.169708 0.061274 
4. Real data example: Croatian personal taxes and cash social benefits 
4.1. Data 
The fiscal subsystem analyzed here consists of social security contributions (SSC; for the 
pension, health and unemployment insurance funds), personal income tax and surtax (PITS), 
public pensions and six types of cash social benefits.15 
The data on incomes arrive from the Croatian household budget survey (Anketa o 
potrošnji kućanstava; APK). Since APK registers only net incomes of household members, it 
was a pre-requisite to build a microsimulation model to obtain amounts of pre-fiscal income, 
PITS and SSC. APK is available for years 2001 to 2008, and samples contain around 3,000 
households. The analysis here is based on the 2008 APK sample, consisting of 3,108 households. 
Pre- and post-fiscal incomes are obtained in the following way. Denote with kX& , kT& , kB&  
and kkkk BTXN &&&& +−= , the pre-fiscal income, the sum of all taxes paid, the sum of all benefits 
received and the post-fiscal income of household k . Incomes are deflated by the equivalence 
factor obtained using the ‘modified OECD scale’, kkk ca 3.0)1(5.01 +−+=β , where ka  and kc  
are number of adults and children in household k. 
                                                   
15
 Basic support allowances, unemployment benefit, child allowance, sick-leave benefit, maternity and layette 
supplement, and supplement for the injured and support for rehabilitation and employment of people with 
disabilities. 
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Income units are shown in Figure 2, with incomes expressed as ratios to the mean pre-
fiscal income. Let us first concentrate on the units to the left of the dotted vertical line. They 
account for about 22% of all analyzed units. One half of them are units with zero pre-fiscal 
income; for the other half, the pre-fiscal income is greater than zero, but quite low – below 1/10 
of the mean pre-fiscal income. The mean post-fiscal income of these two groups is 62% and 52% 
of mean pre-fiscal income, respectively; thus, the zero pre-fiscal income units have somewhat 
higher post-fiscal incomes.16 
FIGURE 2 
SCATTERGRAM OF PRE- AND POST-FISCAL INCOMES 
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EPI vector EiN  is obtained using Curve Fitting Toolbox 1.2 (henceforth CFT), an 
interactive tool for graphical data exploration working within Matlab R2007b. CFT enables the 
use of a dozen pre-programmed parametric and non-parametric models, as well as purely user-
defined models. The model employed in this research is based on Fourier series – a sum of sine 
and cosine functions describing a periodic signal.17 
                                                   
16
 Pensioners prevail in this group, and there is a large variety in the level of pension income, as can be seen in 
Figure 2 if we look at the dots lying on the vertical axis. 
17
 The number of ‘terms’ or ‘harmonics’ is set to 8; the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm is employed and the robust 
fitting options are not used. The top twelve pre-fiscal income units are excluded from the fitting process and their 
values EiN  are set to be equal to 
x
iN . The same set-up was used in estimation of 
P
iU ε, . 
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The advantage of this model is that it can provide us with the spoon-shape curve, which 
describes well the specific feature of the current data, where EPI initially falls. The EPI starting 
point (i.e. when pre-fiscal income is zero) is approximately equal to the mean post-fiscal income 
for the group of zero pre-fiscal income equals. Another two other desirable features of this 
particular method are: (a) the difference , ,( ,0, ; ) ( ,0, ; )E x x xi i i iI N I Nν νν ω ν ω−
) )) )
 is very close to zero: 
for 2.1=ν  ( 3=ν ) it is equal to 0.02% (0.14%) of RE; (b) the difference between the means of 
E
iN  and 
x
iN  is only 0.0001%. Thus, the estimate convincingly passes the tests proposed in 
section 3.3. above and the Appendix. 
The results for the DJA decomposition for the Croatian fiscal system are shown in Table 
3. The underestimation of the reranking term, ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν , is small relative to RE (less than 2% of 
∆
) ), but when compared to total HI, measured by ( , ) ( , )C Rε ν ε ν+) ) , it ranges from 3.3% to 5.6% 
for different combinations of ε  and ν . 
TABLE 3 
INDICES OBTAINED FOR THE REAL FISCAL SUBSYSTEM 
0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
2=ν  
5.0=ε  
3=ν  
5.0=ε  
1=ν  
( )xiI X
)
 
0.514079 0.702777 0.845047 0.284834 
)(ˆ niNI  0.299155 0.340488 0.448383 0.074615 
)(ˆ xiNI  0.254675 0.299256 0.374014 0.074615 
)( xiNI
)
 
0.252521 0.296900 0.367694 0.074615 
,
( )PiI U ε
)
 0.252653 0.297038 0.368091 0.074616 
( )EiI N
)
 
0.252653 0.269239 0.336353 0.053050 
   
 
( , )ε ν∆)  0.214924 0.362289 0.396663 0.210219 
( , )V ε ν)  0.261426 0.433538 0.508693 0.231783 
( , )C ε ν)  -0.000132 0.027661 0.031341 0.021564 
( , )R ε ν)  0.046634 0.043588 0.080689 0.000000 
 
   
 
ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν  0.002153 0.002356 0.006320 0.000000 
( , )Rψ ε ν)  0.044480 0.041232 0.074369 0.000000 
( , )Cψ ε ν)  0.002022 0.030017 0.037661 0.021564 
ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν  (% ∆) ) 1.00 0.65 1.59 0.00 
ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν  (%HI) 4.6 3.3 5.6 0.00 
)()(ˆ
,
x
i
P
i NIUI
)
−ε  -0.000132 -0.000138 -0.000396 -0.000002 
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4.2. Reranking effect underestimated  
As already noted, in presence of pre-fiscal equals, if the non-adapted weights νϖ ,ˆ xi  are used, the 
reranking (CHI) effect will be underestimated (overestimated) by the amount ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν . This fault 
may not be evident for 0ε > , but when 0ε = , it becomes quite obvious. Namely, the CHI effect 
does not exist in the DJA model by construction, i.e. (0, ) 0Cψ ν =) , but in the presence of large 
number of exact pre-fiscal equals, it will be positive. This can be quite confusing to practitioners 
who are testing whether their EPI vector estimate is appropriate, following the recipe from 
section 3.3. To prevent this, they should not forget to use the adapted weights ,xi
νω
)
, in the 
beginning of the analysis. 
It is interesting to see how the use of the wrong weights would affect the results. Duclos, 
Jalbert and Araar (2003) were analysing the ratio between the CHI and reranking terms, which 
indicates the relative importance of CHI versus reranking in the analysed fiscal system. Figure 3 
shows these ratios for the Croatian fiscal system, for different values of ν  and ε . Two different 
sets of ratios are presented: (a) the incorrect ones, ( , ) / ( , )C Rψ ψε ν ε ν) ) , and (b) the correct ones, 
( , ) / ( , )C Rε ν ε ν) ) . They both increase in ε  and ν/1 . The incorrect ratio, ( , ) / ( , )C Rψ ψε ν ε ν) ) , 
significantly overestimates the correct one, ( , ) / ( , )C Rε ν ε ν) ) , by up to 20 percentage points. 
FIGURE 3 
CHI / RERANKING RATIO 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
ε
v=1.4
v=2
v=3
v=1.4
v=2
v=3
Cψ / Rψ
C / R
 
Legend: C / R = ( , ) / ( , )C Rε ν ε ν) ) , Cψ / Rψ = ( , ) / ( , )C Rψ ψε ν ε ν) )  
Let us now look at the structure of the vertical effect, ( , )V ε ν) , presented in Figure 4, 
where all components are separately identified as shares in ( , )V ε ν) . Note that 
( , )R ε ν) = ( , )Rψ ε ν) + ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν . When 1=ν , there can be no reranking and CHI makes about 10% of 
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the vertical effect. If 1=ν  and 0=ε , there is no inequality at all, and consequently no RE, CHI, 
and other effects. 
When 0=ε  and 1>ν , CHI in the DJA model does not exist. For 1>ν  and 0>ε , the 
ratio ( , )C ε ν) / ( , )V ε ν)  increases with ε , while it is opposite for ( , )Rψ ε ν) / ( , )V ε ν) . On the other 
hand, keeping ε
 
constant and by increasing ν , the ratio ( , )C ε ν) / ( , )V ε ν)  increases only slightly, 
while the ratio ( , )Rψ ε ν) / ( , )V ε ν)  increases significantly with ν .18 
FIGURE 4 
COMPOSITION OF VERTICAL EFFECT 
(a) 1=ν      (b) 4.1=ν  
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(c) 2=ν      (d) 3=ν  
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Legend: C = ( , )C ε ν) , ψ = ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν , Rψ = ( , )Rψ ε ν) , RE = ∆)  
 
4.4. The reranking effect of the counterfactual system 
The models like DJA, K84 and AJL have achieved their popularity, among other things, 
due to apparently simple interpretation for policy purposes. The explanation usually goes like 
                                                   
18
 Notice that the ratio ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν / ( , )V ε ν)  has the same pattern of change as ( , )Rψ ε ν) / ( , )V ε ν) , which is expected 
as we know that ˆ ( , )ψ ε ν  is a component of overall reranking, ( , )R ε ν) . The latter would be wrongly perceived as 
part of CHI if the weights ,ˆ xi
νω  were used. 
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this: “If HI is somehow eliminated, RE would be enhanced by the amount equal to the HI 
effect(s)”. Thus, the vertical effect serves as a yardstick of ‘potential’ RE, namely, the higher 
level of RE that would be achieved by the fiscal system in the absence of HI.  
The scholars usually disclaim that they are suggesting policy makers to eliminate HI in 
practice. However, to better understand the model and its results, we can ask at least 
hypothetically: how HI can eliminated?  
Dardanoni and Lambert (2001:p.808) describe the curious relationship between two 
varieties of HI, concluding that CHI and reranking are interconnected concepts: “If the density 
function ),( yxh  is jointly continuous in x  and y , as one finds in very large samples (...), then 
the one form of HI occurs if and only if the other does.”19 They continue: “In particular, in the 
continuous case, both approaches define the absence of HI by the existence of a deterministic 
[post-fiscal income] function [ ( )y f x= ]”. In fact, the values of this function are represented by 
the EPI curve ( )EN p  and estimated through ( )E xim X , as in section 3.3. 
We can conclude that the EPI curve ( )EN p  (and its empirical estimate EiN ) eliminate 
both CHI and reranking. However, there is one important qualification, acknowledged by 
Dardanoni and Lambert (2001:p.808): the function ( )E xim X  must be strictly increasing. Is this 
the case in reality? Not necessarily, as the following example shows. 
Notice that the EPI curve in Figure 2 is decreasing on the interval [0,0.1] (the upper 
boundary being marked by the vertical dotted line). It means that the counterfactual system (CS) 
defined by EPI eradicates CHI, but is not free of reranking. Namely, in this CS the units in 
interval [0,0.1] have higher expected post-fiscal incomes than some units outside this interval: 
the latter ones are reranked by the former ones. Therefore, certain amount of HI will exist in the 
form of reranking albeit CHI is absent. 
But, how large is this reranking effect caused by CS? We can compute the DJA model 
indicators for the CS as follows. Pre-fiscal incomes and frequency weights are equal to the 
original ones: ,x cs xi iX X=  and 
,x cs x
i iϕ ϕ= . Post-fiscal incomes xiN  are replaced by expected post-
                                                   
19
  A proof follows: “If 0),( 00 >yxh , then ),( yxh  will be strictly positive in some neighbourhood of ),( 00 yx , 
and one would necessarily find positive density at four points: ),( 00 eyx + , ),( 00 eyx − , ),( 00 eyex +−  and 
),( 00 eyex −+  for some small 0>e . That is, CHI exists (consider the first two points) and so does reranking 
(the last two).”  
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fiscal incomes EiN  of the actual system: 
,x cs E
i iN N= . Expected post-fiscal incomes of CS are 
equal to expected post-fiscal incomes EiN  of the actual system; 
, ,E cs E x cs
i i iN N N= = . Post-fiscal 
incomes niN  and frequency weights 
n
iϕ  are sorted together in increasing order to obtain ,n csiN  
and ,n csiϕ .  
We know from (14) that the CHI effect of CS is zero for all ε , simply because 
, ,E cs x cs
i iN N= . The vertical effect is equal to the one achieved by the actual system, because 
,x cs x
i iX X=  and 
,E cs E
i iN N= . If the vertical effect of actual system really represents the potential 
RE with properties defined as above, the RE of CS should be equal to ( , )V ε ν) . However, in our 
example, this is not the case, because CS did not eliminate all HI. Namely, the reranking effect 
of CS will be greater than zero, , ,ˆ( ) ( ) 0n cs E csi iI N I N− >
)
, and RE of CS will be smaller than the 
vertical effect of the actual system: ( , ) ( , )cs Vε ν ε ν∆ <) ) . 
Figure 5 shows different effects that ‘constitute’ the vertical effect, all of them expressed 
as shares in pre-fiscal income inequality: (a) redistributive effect, ∆) ; (b) HI of the actual system 
reduced by the reranking of CS, csH R R+ −
) ) )
; (c) reranking of CS itself, csR) . The three 
components together make the vertical effect of actual system, V H R= ∆ + +
)) ) )
, which supposedly 
represents the RE that would be achieved if HI would be eliminated. However, in our example 
this is not true: attainable RE is lowered because EPI induces reranking in amount measured by 
csR
)
. 
For 1=ν  there can be no reranking and 0csR =
)
. For 1>ν  it increases with ν , from 
modest 0.3% of ( )xiI X
)
 for 4.1=ν  and 5.0=ε , to 1.4% of ( )xiI X
)
 for 3=ν  and 0=ε , when 
the share of csR
)
 in HI of the actual system reaches 11.4%.  
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FIGURE 5 
COMPOSITION OF VERTICAL EFFECT 
(a) 1=ν       (b) 4.1=ν  
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(c) 2=ν       (d) 3=ν  
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Legend: Rc/IX = / ( )cs xiR I X
) )
, (HIa-Rc)/IX = [ ] / ( )cs xiH R R I X+ −
) ) ) )
, REa/IX = / ( )xiI X∆
) )
 
Figure 5 shows the levels of actual and potential RE. For all combinations of parameters 
both potential and actual RE are quite high for Croatian system of personal taxes, public 
pensions and cash social benefits. For example, when 5.1=ν  and 4.0=ε ,20 pre-fiscal inequality 
is reduced by no less than 57.6%, whereas the potential reduction (adjusted by csR) ) is 65.6% . 
5. Conclusion 
The models decomposing redistributive effect of fiscal systems into vertical and horizontal 
effects are extensively used by practitioners. Duclos, Jalbert and Araar’s (2003) model, despite 
its advantages over some other models, such as Kakwani’s (1984) and Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert’s (1994) decompositions of RE, has not yet been extensively employed in empirical 
research, possibly due to certain difficulties emerging in its implementation.  
This paper carefully explained the procedures of data manipulations, estimations and 
calculations needed to obtain the indices of the DJA model. Several hints are suggested that 
make the job of practitioners much easier and the results more confident. Firstly, it was shown 
                                                   
20
 The combination of parameters preferred by Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003). 
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that some indices can be calculated in more simple way: the estimation of EPU is unnecessary 
because the relevant index of inequality can be calculated simply using sample post-fiscal 
incomes. Secondly, a straightforward test is presented which indicates whether EPI is 
appropriately estimated: when the ethical parameter of the utility function is zero, the 
concentration coefficients obtained for EPI and sample post-fiscal incomes should be equal. 
Furthermore, during the application of the model using the data on Croatian individual 
taxes and cash social benefits, a new problem emerged. One of the research scenarios treated 
public pensions as social benefits and hence not as a part of pre-fiscal income. Therefore, the 
sample contained a large number of zero pre-fiscal income equals. One of the common formulas 
for computation of the concentration coefficient of post-fiscal incomes produced flawed results, 
because it disregarded the fact that pre-fiscal equals should be assigned equal and not different 
weights. We explained which adjustments must be made in order to obtain the correct estimates. 
Another peculiarity is observed during the study of Croatian fiscal system. Namely, the 
estimated EPI curve is not increasing in pre-fiscal income across the whole distribution of pre-
fiscal incomes. This implies that the counterfactual fiscal system defined by EPI does not fully 
eliminates HI, as a certain amount is present in the form of reranking. 
Besides serving as a ‘cookbook’ for implementation of the DJA model, the paper has also 
analysed its connections with the K84 decomposition, and the issue of vertical effect as a 
measure of potential redistributive effect. The findings of the analysis can be interesting to all 
researchers in the field of income redistribution measurement.  
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Appendix: 
Indices for niN : 
 
1( , ) ( ) / (1 )n ni iU N N εε ε−= −  (18) 
 
, ,
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , )sn n n n ni i j j jjW N U N
ν νε ν ω ε φ ω
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑  (19) 
 
1
, , 1ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) 1 [(1 ) ( , , ; )] / ( )n n n n ni i i i iI N W N Nν ν εε ν ω ε ε ν ω µ−= − −  (20) 
Indices for xiN : 
 
1( , ) ( ) / (1 )x xi iU N N εε ε−= −  (21) 
 
, ,
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) ( , )sx x x x xi i j j ijW N U N
ν νε ν ω ε φ ω
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑  (22) 
 
1
, , 1ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ; ) 1 [(1 ) ( , , ; )] / ( )x x x x xi i i i iI N W N Nν ν εε ν ω ε ε ν ω µ−= − −  (23) 
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, ,
1
( , , ; ) ( , )sx x x x xi i j j ijW N U N
ν νε ν ω ε φ ω
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑
) ) )
 (24) 
 
1
, , 1
ˆ( , , ; ) 1 [(1 ) ( , , ; )] / ( )x x x x xi i i i iI N W N Nν ν εε ν ω ε ε ν ω µ−= − −
) )) )
 (25) 
Indices for EiN : 
 
1( , ) ( ) / (1 )E Ei iU N N εε ε−= −  (26) 
 
, ,
1
( , , ; ) ( , )sE x E x xi i j j jjW N U N
ν νε ν ω ε φ ω
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑
) ) )
 (27) 
 
1
, , 1
ˆ( , , ; ) 1 [(1 ) ( , , ; )] / ( )E x E x Ei i i i iI N W N Nν ν εε ν ω ε ε ν ω µ−= − −
) )) )
 (28) 
Indices for PiU : 
 
, ,
, ,1
( , , ; ) sP x P x xi i i j jjW U U
ν ν
ε εε ν ω φ ω
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑
) ) )
 (29) 
 
1
, , 1
, ,
ˆ( , , ; ) 1 [(1 ) ( , , ; )] / ( )P x P x xi i i i iI U W U Nν ν εε εε ν ω ε ε ν ω µ−= − −
) )) )
 (30) 
where ˆ ( )niNµ , ˆ ( )xiNµ  and ˆ ( )EiNµ  are means of post-fiscal income variables, equal to 
1
ˆ ( ) ( ) sn n ni i iiN S Nµ φ−= ∑ , 1ˆ ( ) ( )
sx x x
i i ii
N S Nµ φ−= ∑  and 1ˆ ( ) ( ) sE x Ei i iiN S Nµ φ−= ∑ , respectively. It 
is clear that ˆ ˆ( ) ( )x ni iN Nµ µ= , because both niN  and xiN  contain the same sample values, only 
differently sorted. However, we should also have that ˆ ˆ( ) ( )E xi iN Nµ µ≈ , saying that the mean 
value of the estimated vector is very close to the sample-based value. This is another indicator 
showing the appropriateness of EPI estimation. 
Yet another (approximate) equality that should exist if all calculations are done properly 
is the one between total (or mean) utilities: 
 
,
( , ) ( , ) ( , )s s s sx x n n x P x Ei i i i i i i ii i i iU N U N U U Nεφ ε φ ε φ φ ε= ≈ ≈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (31) 
